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The German White-Book

Authorized translation

Documents relating
to the Outbreak of the War
with Supplements



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**Documents relating
to the Outbreak of the War
with Supplements**

On June 28th 1914 the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime made by the Austro-Hungarian authorities has proved that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was not only organized in Belgrade, but aided and abetted by Servian officials, and executed with arms from a Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only as regards the aims of the Servian policy directed against the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the Pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims. Appendix 1.

The goal of this policy was to gradually revolutionize and finally separate the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and to unite them with Servia. In spite of Servia's repeated and solemn declarations and assurances to change this policy towards Austria-Hungary as well as to cultivate good and neighbourly relations with Austria this policy has been adhered to continuously.

Thus Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war for the third time within the last six years.

Only because she expected support from Russia could Servia adopt such an attitude.

Soon after the events resulting from the Turkish revolution of 1908, Russia endeavoured to bring about under her patronage a union of the Balkan states directed against the existence of Turkey. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed when it came to the question of the distribution of spoils. Russia's policy, however, was not put off by this failure. The Russian statesmen now conceived the idea of a new Balkan union under Russian patronage, which, however, should no longer be directed against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan she was to be isolated, Roumania was to be attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia was promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it became clear that it was no longer compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy to view idly the Servian agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government apprised Germany of these views and asked for our opinion. Wholeheartedly

we were able to agree with our ally's view of the situation, and assure her that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the very existence of the Monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly well aware that a possible war-like attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that we might therefore be involved in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, considering the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude incompatible with her dignity, nor could we deny her our assistance in these trying days, more especially as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. Had the Serbs with the aid of Russia and France been allowed to go on menacing the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under the Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. Austria morally weakened under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever increasingly menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We therefore granted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but we did not participate in her preparations.

Austria chose to present to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the Pan-Serb movement, as not only
 Appendix 1a. countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was exposed, and in which she demanded that this agitation should cease, and that those who were found guilty should be punished. At the same time Austria-Hungary postulated as necessary guarantee for the execution of her demands that some Austrian officials should participate in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and that the Pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary should be dissolved for good. The Imperial and Royal Government granted a term of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

One day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note the Servian Government began the mobilization of its army.

After the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, in some points complied with the conditions made by Austria-Hungary, which however in all the essential points showed that Serbia through procrastination and new negotiations was trying to escape from the just demands of the Monarchy; the latter therefore broke off her diplomatic relations with Serbia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further assurances from Serbia, whose value, to her own loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Serbia, which was officially proclaimed on the 28th of July by a formal declaration of war.

From the beginning of the conflict it was our opinion that this was a matter which Austria *alone* would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore directed our efforts towards localizing the war, and towards convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable selfdefence, forced upon her under the existing circumstances. We emphatically held the opinion that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers. Appendices
1b & 2.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Serbia towards the Monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkans. Appendix 3.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the British Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours

did not succeed in preventing Russia from interfering in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

Appendix 4. The Russian Government submitted an official communication on July 24th, which declared that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servo-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés. In the afternoon of July 26th the Austrian Government, through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg, again declared that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wanted peace at her
Appendix 5. frontiers.

Appendices 6, 7, 8, 9. In the course of the same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin.

Appendices 10, 10 a, 10 b. In the evening of July 26th the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Russia the danger of this Russian mobilization. Austria-Hungary having officially declared to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision upon the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

“Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

“Mobilization however means war.

“Knowing the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding”.

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchomlinow, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honour that no order to mobilize had been issued, that merely preparations were being made, but not a horse had been mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts adjoining Austria, i. e., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, but under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i. e., St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplo-Appendix 11. mats. The Military Attaché then pointed out that these mobilization measures directed against Austria-Hungary were also extremely menacing for Germany.

In the following days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. There was also news about

preparations on the German-Russian frontier, such as the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison. and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: The 14th Corps discontinued its manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we did not relax our efforts to localize the conflict by emphatically working on the various Cabinets.

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that, however much we approved of the idea, we could not participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with

Appendix 12. Servia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it. as was to be expected.

Faithfully upholding the principle that mediation should not deal with the Austro-Servian conflict, which was to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely with the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two powers.

But the conference idea having failed we were also prepared to transmit to Vienna a second proposal made by Sir Edward Grey, suggesting that Austria-Hungary should decide either that the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it might be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, fully appreciating our mediation, remarked that this proposal had been made too late, as the hostilities had already opened.

Appendix 16.

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to make every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the Monarchy.

Unfortunately, all these proposals were frustrated by the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

Appendix 17.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows:

“The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching upon the sovereignty of Servia. I merely promised to report the conversation, pointing out that, Russia having decided upon the baneful

step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia was now demanding from us as regards Austria-Hungary precisely what Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i. e., an infringement of the rights of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,—a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.

“I very solemnly added that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I took great pains to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

“It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia at this moment could not be deserted by Russia.”

On July 29th, the German Military Attaché in St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army:

“The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call on him, and he told me that he had just come from His Majesty and that had been requested by the Secretary of War to assure me once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honour

in the most solemn manner that nowhere had there been a mobilization, viz., calling in of a single man or horse, up to the present time, i. e., 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not guarantee for the future, but he could emphasize that on the fronts directed towards our own frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.

“As, however, I had received repeated news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

“Considering the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves, I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken.”

In reply to various inquiries made as to reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had as yet commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, which, however, was obliterated by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well

as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we tried to mediate incessantly and we supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, suggesting that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i. e., after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

Whilst during the time from July 29th to July 31st supported by England we urgently and continuously endeavoured to mediate, there appeared renewed and accumulating news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while at the same time to our representative in St. Petersburg all such measures were denied on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, the tendencies and basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.

During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the German Emperor and Czar Nicolas an

exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Emperor:

Appendices
18, 20, 21; 22,
23, 23 a.

“I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

Your cordially devoted
Nicolas.”

This telegram of the Czar crossed the following, sent by H. M. the Emperor, also on July 31st, at 2 p. m.:

“Upon your appeal to my friendship and your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already informed you, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued

it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to take measures of defence. My efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world have been carried to the most extreme limits. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. Even now it rests with you to avert it. No one is threatening the honour and peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the result of my mediation. The friendship for you and your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue the military preparations menacing Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the Czar's telegram was despatched at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to inform the Russian Government that Germany had declared the state

Appendix 24. of war as a counter-measure against the general mobili-

zation of the Russian army and navy and that mobilization was bound to follow if Russia did not stop its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notify Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours as to whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, frustrated the laborious efforts at mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian measures of mobilization, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with the continued denial that they had been taken, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sasonow on Juli 31st at midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has *never* Appendix 25. reached us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to H. M. the German Emperor, as follows:

"I have received your telegram. I can understand that you are forced to mobilize. but I should like to have from you the same guarantee which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our

hearts. With God's help our long tried friendship must succeed in preventing the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply."

To this H. M. the German Emperor replied:

"I thank you for your telegram. Yesterday I showed your Government the only way possible to still avert war. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your Government. I was therefore forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply by your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your telegram. I must most earnestly request you to order, without delay, that your troops do not, under any circumstances, commit even the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the term granted to Russia had expired without a reply to our inquiry having arrived, H. M. the Emperor ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p. m.

The German Ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, Appendix 26. he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war, our demands having been refused. Before, however, the German Government had been advised that this order had been carried out, that is to say, already

on the afternoon of August 1st, i. e., on the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

Thus Russia began war against Germany.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris, as ordered, put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p. m.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p. m., giving no clear idea of the attitude of France, as he limited himself Appendix 27. to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened the hostilities.

Concluded on August 2nd midday.

North German Gazette.

July 25th, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian note to Servia.

Berlin, July 24th.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade presented to the Servian Government at 6 o'clock last night a verbal note containing the Austro-Hungarian demands. An answer to this note is expected by Saturday, July 25th, 6 p. m. The note runs as follows:

Appendix 1. On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government, to the Imperial and Royal Government

“Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. In following the counsels of the powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policy towards Austria-Hungary and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations.”

The history of the last years, more especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Servia aiming at a separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has subsequently made itself felt beyond the territory of the kingdom, through acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and attempted murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations expressed in the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It tolerated the criminal doings of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unbridled language of the press, the glorification of the

originators of assassinations, and the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; it tolerated the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into hatred of the Monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government has made itself guilty, lasted up to the very moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance.

It is proved by the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of this outrage of June 28th, that the Sarajevo murder was instigated in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Servian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials.

Owing to these results of the investigation the Imperial and Royal Government can no longer maintain the attitude of forbearance which it has maintained for years towards those agitations emanating from Belgrade, and extending into the territory of the Monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues constituting a permanent menace for the peace of the Monarchy.

In order to obtain this end, the Imperial und Royal Government is forced to demand an official assurance from the Servian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., all the machinations aiming at a separation from the Monarchy of parts belonging thereto, and that she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.

In order to solemnize these obligations, the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:

“The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., all the machinations aiming at a separation from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of territories belonging thereto, and she sincerely regrets the ghastly consequences of such criminal actions.

“The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st. 1909.

“The Royal Government, disapproving of and rejecting every thought or every attempt at influencing the destiny of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will henceforth pro-

ceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, which it will make every effort to prevent and suppress."

This explanation is to be simultaneously notified to the Royal Army by order of H. M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the Army.

"In addition, the Royal Servian Government pledges itself as follows:

1. To suppress any publication fostering hatred of and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity;
2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Obrana, to confiscate its entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Serbia occupying themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary steps to impede the societies that have been dissolved from continuing their activities under another name or in another form;
3. Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the body of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are concerned, anything that serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
4. To remove from the military and civil service in general all officers and officials guilty of propagandizing against Austria-Hungary; the Imperial and Royal Go-

vernment will in time communicate to the Royal Government their names and facts the adduced against them;

5. To consent to officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operating in Serbia in the suppression of the agitation directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. To enter into judicial proceedings against those participants of the conspiracy of June 28th who are now on Servian territory. Officials delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the investigations;

7. To proceed at once with all severity with the arrest of Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganovic, a Servian State official, who have been compromised by the result of the investigations;

8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials stationed at Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier;

9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations regarding the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who, when interviewed after the outrage of June 28th, in spite of their official position did not hesitate to express themselves in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary.

10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply by the Royal Government not later than Saturday 25th inst.. at 6 p. m. A memorial dealing with the results

of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7. and 8., is enclosed with this note."

Enclosure.

The criminal proceedings taken against Gabrilo Princip and his accomplices by the Court of Sarajevo, with regard to the assassination on June 28th, have adduced the following facts:

1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovic, and a certain Milan Ciganovic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
2. Six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinovic and Grabez in Belgrade.
3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac.
4. To insure the success of the assassination. Milan Ciganovic instructed Princip Gabrinovic in the use of the grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground of Topshider.
5. In order to enable Princip Gabrinovic and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to smuggle their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganovic. The entry of the criminals

with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popovic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.

The Servian Answer.

The Note presented by the Royal Servian Government and dated July 12/25th, 1914. runs as follows.

The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will do away with any misunderstanding threatening to destroy the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austrian Monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.

The Royal Government is aware that on no occasion have there been renewed the protests against the great neighbourly Monarchy which at the time were expressed in the Skuptschina. as well as by the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the state, and which were brought to an end by the Servian declaration of March 18th, 1909: and further that since that time neither the various Governments of the kingdom in their succession, nor their officials have made any attempt to alter the political and judicial conditions created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government begs to state that the I. and R. Government has made no protest in this sense excepting in the case of a school-book, in regard to which, however, the I. und R. Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation.

During the Balkan crisis Serbia has in numerous cases given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy, and the preservation of peace is only due to the sacrifices which Serbia has made in the interest of the peace of Europe.

To this point the Austro-Hungarian Government remarks:

The Royal Servian Government confines itself to establishing that since the declaration of March 18th, 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Servian Government and its organs to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, thus deliberately altering the very basis of our note, which did not contend that the Servian Government and its Officials had officially taken any particular steps in that direction. Now our gravamen is that in spite of the obligation which the Servian Government took upon itself in the note cited above, it has failed to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Thus Serbia's obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policy, and in entering into friendly and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not only in not officially interfering with the possession of Bosnia.

The Servian note then goes on:

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, such as newspaper

articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries. and which ordinarily are not controlled by the state, more especially as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a series of questions which have arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, thus succeeding in solving the greater number thereof. to the benefit of both countries.

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the utterances of the press and the activity of Servian associations are of a private character and are thus not subject to the control of the government. is in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal laws regulating the press and societies, which subject these, since they are of a public character, to a certain control by the state. This is also provided for by the Servian institutions. The Servian Government is to be blamed precisely for having totally failed to supervise its press and its associations. knowing their tendency to be hostile to the Monarchy.

Servian note:

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertion that Servian subjects had participated in the preparations of the Sarajevo outrage. The Government had expected an invitation to cooperate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready, in order

to prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it might receive information.

Austro-Hungarian Commentary:

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately informed as to the suspicion resting upon certain clearly defined persons and it was not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done nothing in this direction.

Servian note:

Complying with the wishes expressed by the I. and R. Government, the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen, for the participation of whom in the Sarajevo crime it shall have received proofs. In particular it binds itself to publish on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July the following enunciation:

“The Royal Servian Government condemns any propaganda that might be directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., such activities in their entirety as aim at the separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it sincerely regrets the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations.”

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

The Austrian demand reads:

“The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary.....”

The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, or that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere and treacherous, the Servian Government reserving to itself for later occasions the subterfuge that it had not disavowed by this declaration the propaganda actually existing at the time, nor recognized the same as hostile to the Monarchy, whence it could further deduce that it was not obliged to suppress a propaganda similar to the one now on foot.

Servian note:

The Royal Government regrets that, according to the communication of the I. and R. Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations, the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly promised through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.

“The Government” . . . wording of the demanded text.

Austro-Hungarian commentary:

The formula as demanded by Austria reads:

“The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated” Hence, with this formula, and the further addition, “according to the communication of the I. and R. Government,” the Servian Government pursues the object, indicated above, to retain a free hand for the future.

Servian note:

The Royal Government binds itself further:

1. During the next regular meeting of the Skup-tschina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit. that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the Monarchy will be punished most severely, likewise any publication, the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

In view of the impending revision of the Constitution it binds itself to add an amendment to Art. 22 of the Constitution whereby the confiscation of such publications shall be permitted, which, under the clear provisions of Art. 22 of the constitution as it now stands, is impossible.

Austrian commentary:

Austria had demanded:

1. "The suppression of any publication inciting to hatred and contempt for the Monarchy, and tending to attack the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

We thus wanted to obtain a formal obligation on the part of Servia to see that such attacks by the press should cease in future, in other words, we wanted to make sure of some noticeable change.

Servia instead offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means towards this end, viz.:

a) A law whereby utterances of the press hostile to the Monarchy can be punished in certain cases. This is quite immaterial to us, more especially as the individual

prosecution of press delicts is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposal, therefore, does not in any way meet our demand, and it offers not the slightest guarantee for the desired improvement.

b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the Constitution, which would permit of confiscation. This proposal does not satisfy us either, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us, constituting merely the obligation of the Government to apply the law; but we have not been promised that this will really be done. For we want the *obligation* of the Government to *enforce* it, and that has not been promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive, as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the case of these laws not being carried by the Skuptschina, everything would remain as it is, unless, of course, the Government were to resign.

Servian note:

2. The Government possesses no proofs, nor does the note of the I. and R. Government furnish such, that the society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed, up to the present day, any criminal actions of the said manner through one of their members. Notwithstanding, the Royal Government accepts the demand of the I. and R. Government and will dissolve the society

Narodna Odbrana, as well as any other society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

Austrian commentary:

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the Monarchy saturates the entire public life of Servia. The reserve made by the Servian Government asserting that it knows nothing about it is altogether unacceptable. Besides, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we further postulated:

“To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies and to prevent the refounding of the dissolved societies under another name and in another form.”

On these two points the Belgrade Cabinet remains silent, so that by this incomplete concession there is offered us no guarantee that an end shall be put to the agitation of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana by dissolving them.

Servian note:

3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs thereof.

Austrian commentary:

In this case also the Servian Government demands proofs that hostility towards the Monarchy^u is being

publicly taught in Servian schools, whereas it must needs know that the books introduced in the Servian schools contain such obnoxious matter and that a large number of Servian schoolmasters are members of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Moreover, the Servian Government has only partly fulfilled our demands, having omitted in its note the addition desired by us: "As far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction"—a passage showing clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools.

Servian note:

4. The Royal Government is also prepared to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil service who by judicial investigation have been found guilty of actions directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; it expects that the I. and R. Government will communicate the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged, so that the proceedings may be begun.

Austrian commentary:

The Servian Government, by promising to dismiss from the military and civil service those officers and officials who have been found guilty by judicial procedure, is limiting its assent to those cases only in which these persons have been charged with a criminal offence.

As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which in general is not subject to punishment in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point.

Servian note:

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not quite clear as to the meaning and scope of the demand made by the I. and R. Government concerning the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every cooperation not inconsistent with international and criminal law, as well as with friendly and neighbourly relations.

Austrian commentary:

International law, as well as criminal law, have nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of police to be handled by the state police and which may be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

Servian note:

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of

June 28th and who are now in its territory. As to the co-operation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government, this cannot be accepted, as this would mean a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might reasonably be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.

Austrian commentary:

The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable. We demanded:

1. The instituting of a criminal proceeding against the participants in the outrage.

2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire").

3. It did not mean to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were only to cooperate in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation.

If the Servian Government misunderstands this point, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. Wishing to avoid any control of the investigation which, if carried out correctly, would yield results highly undesirable to the Servian Government, and possessing no plausible excuse to refuse the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police inter-

vention exist in great number), it tries to justify its refusal by picturing our demands as impossible.

Servian note :

7. The Royal Government on the evening of the day on which the note was received ordered the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. As to Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who until June 28th was employed in the Servian Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him; a warrant was therefore issued against him.

The I. and R. Government is requested to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of the conduct of the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt¹ obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo.

Austrian commentary :

This reply is perfidious. According to our investigations, Ciganovic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left for Ribari three days after the outrage, it having become known that Ciganovic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganovic quitted the Servian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of the police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of the said Ciganovic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganovic did not exist in Belgrade.

Servian note:

8. The Servian Government will extend and render more severe the measures existing for the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.

It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is prepared to give explanations with regard to utterances made in interviews by Servian officials in Servia and abroad after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where these utterances were made and succeeds in proving that they were actually made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will see that the necessary evidence and proofs are collected.

Austrian commentary:

The Royal Servian Government must have full knowledge of the interviews in question. By asking the I. and R. Government to furnish all sorts of details with regard to the said interviews and by reserving for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it does not seriously intend to fulfill the demand.

Servian Note:

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been done already in the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of these measures has been ordered and put into execution.

The Royal Servian Government believes it to be of common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is, therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, either by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at the Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on March 31st, 1909."

End of the Note.

Extract from the Austro-Hungarian records.

Vienna. July 27. The dossier concerning the Servian conflict, mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the embassies of the foreign powers, was made public to-day.

This memorial directs attention to the fact that the campaign inspired by Servia, having as its purpose the wresting of the southern part of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy and its incorporation in the Servian state, began a long time ago. This propaganda, in its end pur-

posing always the same, and varying only in the means employed and in the degree of its activity, reached its climax at the time of the annexation crisis, when it appeared in its true light. While, on the one hand, the entire Servian press agitated for a war against the Monarchy, there were formed—not to mention other propagandist methods—associations which prepared the ground for this conflict, chief among which was the *Narodna Odbrana*. This organization, which was an outgrowth of a revolutionary committee and was completely dependent upon the foreign office at Belgrade, constituted itself under the leadership of statesmen and officers, among whom were General Jankovic and the former Minister Ivanovic. Major Oja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic were also among the organizers. This association had as its purpose the training and equipment of irregulars for the coming war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. One of the documents appended to the memorial is an extract from the organ of the *Narodna Odbrana*, given out by the central committee of the association and bearing the same name as the association, which exhaustively describes in a number of articles the activities and purposes of the organization. It is asserted in these articles that one of the chief aims of the *Narodna Odbrana* is the union with its neighbouring and remote brothers across the border and with “our other friends in the world.”

Austria is described as the first and greatest enemy. In the same manner in which the *Narodna Odbrana* preaches the necessity of a war with Austria, it preaches “the

sacred truth of our situation." The final chapter contains an appeal to the government and the people of Servia to prepare itself in every manner for the conflict which the annexation has shown to be imminent.

The memorial describes, using the statement of a Komitatschi who had been won over as a member of the organization, the activity of the Narodna Odbrana, which supported a school for the training of bands of irregulars. This school was conducted by two captains, one of whom was Tankovic, and was inspected regularly by Captain Milan Pribicevic. The Komitatschis were also *instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, mine-laying, dynamiting of railway bridges, etc.* With the solemn declaration of the Servian Government in 1909 the end of this organization appeared to have come. These expectations, however, were not only not realized, but the propaganda was continued by the Servian press. As an example, the memorial describes the manner in which the attempt upon the life of the Bosnian president, Varesanin, was handled by the press, which praised the assailant as a Servian national hero and glorified his deed. These newspapers were circulated not only in Servia, but were also smuggled into the Monarchy by well organized underground routes.

While the persons who organized it were still its leaders, the Narodna Odbrana became a short while ago the center of an agitation which embraced *the Schützenbund (Marksmen's Association)*, with 762 subordinate associations, a *Sokolbund (an association of gymnasts)*, with 3,500 members, and various other organizations.

In the guise of an educational association, concerned only with the spiritual, physical and material development of the people of Servia, the Narodna Odbrana betrays its real reorganized program in the article from its organ, already referred to, in which it preaches "the sacred truth", declaring that it is *an essential necessity to conduct with rifle and cannon a war of extermination against Austria, its chief and greatest enemy*, and to prepare the people with all means for the battle to liberate the subject territories, in which many million brothers languish under their yoke. The proclamations and speeches of similar character cited in the memorial illuminate the manysided foreign policy of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies, which embraced addresses by traveling lecturers and participation in the banquets of Bosnian associations, at which there was open proselytizing for members for the Servian association. An investigation is at present under way to determine whether the gymnastic associations of Servia induced similar associations in the Monarchy to join with them in an organization that has so far remained secret. The agitation was brought to bear by secret agents and missionaries on adults and on the indiscriminating youth. In this way former Honved officers and a lieutenant of gendarmes were induced by Milan Pribicevic under suspicious circumstances to leave the service of the army in the Monarchy. A further extensive agitation was developed in the training schools for teachers. The wished for war against the Monarchy was so far prepared for that Servian emissaries

were entrusted with the destruction of transportation facilities and with the instigation of revolts and panics in case of an outbreak of hostilities. All these things are substantiated in a separate supplement.

The memorial describes further the connection between this activity of the Narodna Odbrana and of its affiliated organizations and the attempts upon the royal commissioner in Agram, Cuvaj, in July, 1912, the attempt by Dojeie in Agram in 1913 upon Skerlec, and the foiled attempt of Schäfer on May 20th in the Agram Theatre. It then deals with the connection between this activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies and *the attempt upon the heir to the throne and his wife*, upon the manner in which the boys in the schools were corrupted by the ideas of the Narodna Odbrana, and upon the manner in which the assailants of the royal couple, with the assistance of Pribicevic and Dacic, secured the means for carrying out their attempt. In this connection especial attention is devoted to the rôle played by Major Tankosic, who furnished the deadly weapons, and to the rôles of a certain Ciganovic and of a former Komitatschi, at present an official of the Servian railway department in Belgrade, who had already come to the front in 1909 as a pupil of the Narodna Odbrana's school for irregulars. There are further particulars concerning the manner in which bombs and weapons were secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which permit no doubt that the way chosen was a well prepared one, and one often employed by the Narodna Odbrana for secret ends.

A supplement contains an excerpt from the proceedings of the court-martial in Serajevo in *the investigation of the attempt upon Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife*. According to this, Prineip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic and Papovic confess to having formed, in connection with Mehmedbasic, who has fled, *a plot to murder the Archduke*, and to having lain in wait for him with this purpose. Cabrinovic confesses to having thrown the bomb and Gabrilo Prineip to having carried out the attempt with the Browning revolver. Both confessed that they acted with intent to murder. The other sections of the supplement contain further statements of the defendants before the examining magistrate concerning the origin of the plot and the source whence the bombs were obtained, which were factory-made, designed for military purposes and came from the Servian arms depot in Kragujevac in their original packing. The supplement, in closing, gives information concerning the transport of the three assailants and of the weapons from Servia to Bosnia. A further extract from the testimony of witnesses before the court discloses the fact that a subject of the Monarchy wished, some days before the attempt, to inform the Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Belgrade of his belief that a plan was on foot to make an attempt upon the life of the Archduke during his presence in Bosnia. This man is said to have been arrested by Belgrade police agents upon frivolous grounds just as he was about to enter the consulate, and thus to

have been hindered from giving his warning. It is said that the testimony also shows that *the police who made this arrest knew of the planned attempt*. Since these assertions have not yet been investigated, no judgment can yet be given as to their correctness. In the supplement to the memorial it is said: "In front of the reception hall of the Servian Ministry of War are to be found on the walls four allegorical pictures, three of which are representations of Servian successes in war, while the fourth represents the fulfilment of the anti-Austrian tendencies of Servia. Above a landscape, which presents in part mountains (Bosnia), in part plains (Southern Hungary), rises the Zora, the dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground stands an armed female figure, carrying a shield upon which are inscribed the names of 'all provinces yet to be liberated', Bosnia, Herzegovina, Woiwodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc."

Appendix 1b.

The Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on July 23rd, 1914.

The publications made by the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the circumstances under which the assassination of the heir apparent to the Austrian throne and his consort took place, clearly disclose the aims which the Pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes for their realization. The facts published must dispel the last doubt that the center

of action of these efforts aiming at the separation of the South Slavonic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade, where it is displaying its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and the Army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. The Pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself most markedly during the Bosnian crisis. It was only due to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the powers that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The promise of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, has not been kept. Under the very eyes, or, to say the least, tacitly suffered by official Servia, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade, is to be laid at its door. It has become evident that it is incompatible either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to continue to view idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. In this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed as absolutely justifiable. Nevertheless, considering the attitude assumed by

public opinion as well as by the government in Serbia, it is to be feared that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. There would then be nothing left to the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to press its demands with the Servian Government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with Austria.

I have the honour to request you to make a statement on the lines indicated above to (the present substitute of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sazonow) especially emphasising the view, that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure the limitation to the parties concerned. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every intercession of another power, owing to the various treaty-alliances, would precipitate inconceivable consequences.

I am awaiting with interest a telegraphic report on the course of your interview.

Appendix 2.

The Imperial Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany. Confidential. Berlin, July 28th, 1914.

Kindly make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited:

Considering the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must now disappear as to the fact that the outrage to which the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, with, to say the least, the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the Pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The Pan-Serb chauvinism was most especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. It is only due to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the powers that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time did not lead to a conflict. The Servian Government has not kept its assurance given at the time, that in future it would be well-behaved. Nay under the very eyes, or at least tacitly suffered by official Servia, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be incompatible with Austria's dignity and with her right of self-preservation for the Austro-Hungarian Government to continue to view idly the intrigues carried on beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. The action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be considered as fully justified by this state of affairs.

The reply made by the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted to them on the 23rd inst. through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to put an end to their former policy and agitation. There will therefore be no other alternative but for the Austro-Hungarian Government to press its demands, if need be by military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great power.

Some Russian personalities deem it the most decided right and duty of Russia to become an active ally with Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from such step made by Russia, the "Novoye Vremya" would even make Germany responsible unless she induced Austria-Hungary to yield.

The Russian press thus turns things turtle. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but Servia who, through unscrupulously favouring Pan-Serb aspirations, even in some parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, has been threatening the very existence of that country and creating conditions which eventually resulted in the wanton outrage committed at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that she must champion the cause of Servia in this matter, she certainly has the right to do so. She must however realize that she is making the Serb activities, tending to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, her own, and that thus she is bearing
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the sole responsibility for the war that may possibly originate from the Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers are desirous to localize. It is evident that this responsibility is resting entirely with Russia and it is weighing all the more heavily as Count Berchtold had officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary had no intention to acquire Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but that she only desired peace from the Servian intrigues threatening her existence.

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this question is clearly indicated. The Pan-Slav agitation against Austria-Hungary has for its goal to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and thus to scatter or weaken the triple alliance, resulting in a complete isolation of the German Empire. Our own interests therefore call us to the side of Austria-Hungary. It is our duty to guard Europe from a universal war, and we are therefore obliged to support all endeavours aiming at the localization of the conflict, true to our policy which we have successfully carried out for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

But if, owing to Russia's interference, the conflagration should happen to spread, then Germany, faithful to her duties as ally, would have to support the neighbour-monarchy with all her might. We shall draw the sword only if forced to do so, but we shall do it with a clear conscience, knowing that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

Appendix 3.**Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.**

Count Berchtold to-day begged the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to call on him in order to explain to him at large and in a cordial way Austria-Hungary's point of view towards Servia. Having referred to the historical development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquests in Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. Austria maintained that this step was meant merely as a definite means of checking the Servian intrigues. Austria-Hungary was compelled to demand a guarantee for continued amicable relations with Servia. He was far from intending to bring about a change in the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanation of the Secretary "ad referendum," with the promise to submit it immediately to Sasonow.

Appendix 4.**Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.**

I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 (p. 45) in a prolonged interview with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged himself in immoderate accusations against Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not under any circumstances permit of the Servo-Austrian difficulty being settled between the two parties concerned.

Appendix 5.**The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor. Telegram of July 26th, 1914.**

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonow this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression, as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest, but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers. greatly pacified the Secretary.

Appendix 6.**Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor on July 25th, 1914.**

Message to H. M. from General von Chelius:

The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to the rank of officers to-day instead of Michaelmas. Headquarters are most excited about Austria's procedure. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria are being made.

Appendix 7.**Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.**

The Military Attaché requests the following message to be sent to the general staff:

I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.

Appendix 8.**Telegram of the Imperial Consulate in Kovno to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.**

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.

Appendix 9.**Telegram of the Imperial Minister in Berne to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.**

Have heard from reliable source that French XIVth corps has discontinued manœuvres.

Appendix 10.**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London. Urgent. July 26th, 1914.**

Austria-Hungary officially and solemnly declared in St. Petersburg that she had no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that she would not touch the existence of the Kingdom. but that she desired to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves in Russia is imminent. which is equivalent to mobilization. If this news proves correct. we shall, very much against our own wish, be forced to countermeasures. Our desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We beg you to work on these lines in St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.

Appendix 10a.**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris. July 26th, 1914.**

Austria-Hungary having officially declared to Russia that she had no intention to acquire territorial gain and

to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision as to a European war rests solely with Russia, which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France, with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe, to exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

Appendix 10b.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.

Austria having solemnly declared its territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely with Russia. We still trust that Russia will undertake no steps which will seriously threaten the peace of Europe.

Appendix 11.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.

Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War:

Sasonow had requested the latter to inform me on the situation. The Secretary of War gave me his word of honour that no order to mobilize had as yet been issued. Though preliminary preparations were being made, no reserves had been called in and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as were directed towards Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, were to be mobilized. Under no

circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against Austria as most menacing.

Appendix 12.

**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial
Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.**

We have as yet received no news of a suggestion made by Sir Edward Grey to hold a quadruple conference in London. We find it impossible to place our ally in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

Appendix 13.

**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial
Ambassador in London on July 25th, 1914.**

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interfere in the former any more than England, and, as heretofore, we still maintain that this question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. We therefore sincerely hope that Russia, knowing her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation, will abstain *from inter-*

fering. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, remembering at the same time our duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria in conjunction with the other powers.

Appendix 14.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.

We are continuing in our endeavours to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.

Appendix 15.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.

We have at once commenced efforts at mediation in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey. Besides we have communicated to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonow for a direct parley with Vienna.

Appendix 16.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He, however, remarks that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears somewhat belated.

Appendix 17.**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial
Ambassador in Paris on July 29th, 1914.**

News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

Appendix 18.**Telegram of the Military Attaché in St. Petersburg to
H. M. the German Emperor on July 30th, 1914.**

Prince Troubetzki, having ordered Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered to Czar Nicolas at once, said to me yesterday: "Thank God that a telegram has arrived from your Sovereign!" Just now he told me that the telegram had made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as the mobilization against Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could no longer change matters. I answered that the premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary, which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, would have to be blamed for the unaccountable consequences thereof,

for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested solely upon Russia ignoring Austria-Hungary's assurances that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary had mobilized against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that since the horrible crime committed at Sarajevo Germany could no longer understand the phrase adopted by Russia that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia." I finally told him that he need not wonder if Germany were to mobilize her army.

Appendix 19.

**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial
Ambassador in Rome on July 31st, 1914.**

We have incessantly negotiated between Russia and Austria-Hungary by a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the German Emperor and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped, if they have not been rendered fruitless. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is continually becoming more menacing.

Appendix 20.

I. His Majesty the German Emperor to the Czar.

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

I hear with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused in your country by the action of Austria-

Hungary against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other Sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I do not by any means fail to see the difficulty encountered by you and your Government in stemming the tide of public opinion. True to the cordial friendship which has firmly joined us both for a long time, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to come to a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I confidently hope that you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin

(signed) Wilhelm.

Appendix 21.

II. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p. m.

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An igno-

minious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity such as a European war would be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

(signed) Nicolas.

Appendix 22.

III. His Majesty to the Czar.

Juli 29th, 6.30 p. m.

I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot—as I told you in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia, as long as they are made merely on paper, are entirely unreliable.

I consider the action of Austria-Hungary to be an attempt to receive full guarantee that the promises of Servia are effectively turned into deeds. In this my opinion I am confirmed by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intends no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I therefore believe that it is quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war

it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already wired you—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible efforts. Of course military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as a menace, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

(signed) Wilhelm.

Appendix 23.

IV. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 30th. 1 a. m.

My Ambassador has instructions to draw the attention of your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I have told you the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to your and your Government's statement, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which you have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon your shoulders, you have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(signed) Wilhelm.

Appendix 23a.

V. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof. July 30th. 1914. 1.20 p. m.

I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff with instructions. The military measures now being effectuated were decided upon five days ago, for reasons of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not in any way influence your position as mediator which I value very highly. We need your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

signed: Nicolas.

Appendix 24.**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.**

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization. Russia has mobilized her *entire* army and navy, that is to say, also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which, however, does not imply mobilization. But mobilization is bound to follow, unless Russia stops every measure of war against us and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please communicate this at once to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.

Appendix 25.**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.**

Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and navy, directed also against us in spite of our still pending mediation and although we have not resorted to any mobilization measures. We thereupon declared the threatening state of war, which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours all warlike measures against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made within 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.

Appendix 26.**Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 p. m. Urgent.**

In case the Russian Government makes no satisfactory reply to our demand. Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement:

» Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie. Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et

de St. Pétersbourg. lorsque la Russie. sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne. l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie. «

Please wire, urgent, receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for your passports and hand over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

Appendix 27.

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Imperial Chancellor on August 1st, 1.05 p. m.

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war,

the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

Supplementary documents.

Appendix 28.

Testimony of the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg.

Belgian Legation.

St. Petersburg.

795/402.

On the political situation.

July 30th, 1914.

To His Excellency M. DAVIGNON, Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Monsieur le Ministre!

Yesterday and the day before yesterday have passed in the expectation of events that must inevitably follow Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Servia. The most contradictory reports have been circulating; it was impossible to make out what was true or not as regards the intentions of the Imperial Russian Government. *There is however no denying the fact that Germany has made serious efforts both here and in Vienna to find some way of avoiding a general conflict.* On one hand, however, it has met with the firm decision of the Vienna Cabinet not to yield a step, and on the other hand with the fact that the St. Petersburg Cabinet mistrusted the assurance of Austria-Hungary that it only intended to punish Servia, but not to occupy her territory.

M. SASONOW declared that it was impossible for Russia to avoid holding herself in readiness and not to mobilize. but that these preparations were not directed against Germany. This morning an official communication to the newspapers announced that "the reserves in a certain number of Governments have been called to the colours." *Anyone who knows the reservedness of the official Russian communications, can safely maintain that a general mobilization is taking place.*

The German Ambassador declared this morning that the efforts which since Saturday he has been making incessantly to bring about a satisfactory arrangement had come to an end, and that he had almost given up hope.

I have been told that the British Ambassador has also expressed himself in the same way. England recently proposed arbitration. SASONOW answered: "We have ourselves proposed it to Austria-Hungary, but she has rejected the proposal." To the proposal of a conference, Germany answered by proposing in turn a settlement between the Cabinets. One might truly ask whether the whole world did not wish war and only sought to postpone for a while the declaration of war, in order to gain time.

England at first let it be understood that she did not wish to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said so quite openly. To-day in St. Petersburg one is fully convinced, *and even the assurance has been given, that England will stand by the side of France. This assistance is*

of quite extraordinary weight, and has to no small degree contributed to give the war party the upper hand. The Russian Government has in these last days given free rein to all demonstrations friendly to Servia and hostile to Austria, and has in no way attempted to suppress them. In the Cabinet Council, which took place yesterday morning, there were differences of opinion; the notification of a mobilization was postponed, but since then a change has taken place, *the war party has obtained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the mobilization order was published.*

The army, which feels itself strong, is full of enthusiasm, and bases great hopes on the extraordinary progress which it has made since the Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the completion of its projected reorganization that it is scarcely to be taken into account. For this very reason, *the assurance of English assistance is considered of such great importance.*

As I had the honour of wiring you to-day (T. 10), all hope of a peaceable solution seems to have vanished; such is the view of the diplomatic corps.

I have made use of the route via Stockholm by the Nordisk Cable for sending my telegram, as it is safer than the other.

I am entrusting this report to a private courier, who will post it in Germany.

Please receive, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my greatest respect

(Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

Appendix 29.**Telegram of His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to
H. M. the King of England of July 30th, 1914.**

Am here since yesterday, have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday; he gratefully received your message.

William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfill Nicholas's appeal to him to work for the maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who to-day confirms the news that military measures have been ordered by him tantamount to mobilization, and that these measures were already taken five days ago.

We are furthermore informed that France is making military preparations, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment should our neighbours continue. This would then mean a European war.

If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest that you use your influence on France and Russia to remain neutral. It seems to me that this would be most useful.

This I consider a certain, perhaps the only chance, to maintain the peace of Europe.

I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe which otherwise seems unavoidable.

Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavours to maintain peace, but that the military prepara-

tions of his two neighbours may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless.

I have informed William of my telegram to you and I hope you will receive my information in the same spirit of friendship in which I gave it.

(Signed) HENRY.

Appendix 30.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia of July 30th, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram. Am very glad to hear of William's effort to join with Nicholas to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost to induce Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. I trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve the peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

Appendix 31.**Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England of July 31st, 1914.**

Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statements I got to-night from Vienna and which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from the Chancellor that official notification has just reached him that Nicholas to-night has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and navy. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left me without any news. I am off to Berlin to take measures for ensuring safety of my eastern frontiers, where strong Russian troops are already posted.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

Appendix 32.**Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Imperial Chancellor of August 1st, 1914.**

Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I believed that I could declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared that I thought I could give that assurance.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

Appendix 33.**Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England of August 1st, 1914.**

I just received the communication from your Government in which Great Britain guarantees the neutrality of

France. Added to this offer was the enquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds my mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared: this cannot be countermanded, because your telegram unfortunately came too late. *But if France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British army and navy, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere.* I hope that France will not become nervous. *The troops on my frontier are now in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.*

Appendix 34.

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London of August 1st, 1914.

Germany is ready to accept the British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces the absolute neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. German mobilization has been ordered to-day on account of Russia's challenge before the English proposals were known here. It is therefore now impossible to make any change in the strategical distribution of our troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 p. m. on Monday 3rd inst. if England has consented to our proposal by that time.

(Signed) BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

Appendix 35.**Telegram of H. M. the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor of August 1st, 1914.**

In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Liehnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided as long as there is a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Liehnowsky early to-morrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.

(Signed) GEORGE.

Appendix 36.**Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Imperial Chancellor of August 2nd, 1914.**

Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but *as they were not based on a previous understanding with France* and made without knowledge of our mobilization, *they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless.*

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

Appendix 37.**Text of the Telegraphic Instructions to the German Minister in Brussels, dated August 2nd, 1914.**

The Imperial Government is in possession of *trustworthy information regarding the proposed drawing up of French forces*

on the Meuse, on section Givet-Namur. It permits of no doubt that the French intend to advance against Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial Government fears that Belgium, even with the best of intentions, will not be able, without assistance, to ward off a French approach with so great a chance of success as to furnish a sufficient guarantee against the threatened danger to Germany. It is the postulate of self-preservation that Germany should anticipate the hostile attack. The German Government would therefore much regret if Belgium should consider it an act of hostility towards herself that Germany, through the designs of her adversaries, in her own defense is compelled in turn to enter upon Belgian territory. In order to avoid misconception, the Imperial Government makes the following declaration:

1. *Germany contemplates no acts of hostility against Belgium.* If Belgium in the impending war is willing to take a position of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government pledges itself to guarantee the territorial integrity and independence of the Kingdom to the fullest extent on the conclusion of peace.

2. Germany pledges itself under the above condition *to withdraw her troops from the Kingdom as soon as peace is concluded.*

3. If Belgium maintains a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the Royal Belgian authorities, *to purchase for cash all necessaries required by her troops, and to indemnify Belgium for any damage that might possibly be caused by the German troops.*

If Belgium commence hostilities against the German troops, more especially if she should impede their advance, through a resistance offered by the fortifications on the Meuse, or through the destruction of railways, roads, tunnels or other works, Germany would to its regret be compelled to regard the Kingdom as an enemy. In this case Germany would not be under any obligation to the Kingdom, but would be obliged to leave the adjustment of the relations between the two states to the arbitrament of arms.

Appendix 3δ.

The Breach of Belgian Neutrality by England and Belgium.

The assertion of the British Government that the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany was the cause of England's participation in the present war, has already been proved untenable by Sir Edward Grey's own declaration. Certain documents discovered by the German military authorities in the archives of the Belgian General Staff in Brussels throw a new and somewhat peculiar light upon the pathetic moral indignation at the German invasion of Belgium with which the English tried to stir up the feeling in neutral countries against Germany.

From the contents of a portfolio bearing the inscription, "Intervention anglaise en Belgique," it is evident that the despatch of an English expeditionary corps to Belgium in the event of a Franco-German war was already contemplated as far back as the year 1906. According to a

report of April 10th, 1906, addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, which was found there, the chief of the Belgian General Staff, having repeatedly conferred with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, then English Military Attaché in Brussels, upon the latter's initiative and in conjunction with him, worked out a detailed plan for the joint operations with the Belgian army by an English expeditionary force of 100,000 men against Germany. This plan met with the approval of Major-General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff. Full information as to the strength and organization of the British troops, as to the composition of the expeditionary corps, as to the places of disembarkation and the exact time of the despatch of the troops, etc., was communicated to the Belgian General Staff. On the ground of this information the Belgian General Staff thoroughly prepared for the transportation of the British troops to the basis of their strategical operations against Germany and also for the sheltering and feeding of the troops. All the details for their cooperation (with the Belgians) were carefully worked out. Thus a large number of interpreters and Belgian gendarmes were to be placed at the disposal of the British army, and the necessary maps were to be supplied to them. Provisions were even made for the care of the British wounded.

Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne were selected as ports of disembarkation for the British troops. From these places they were to be transported by Belgian trains into the region of deployment. The fact that the disembark-

kation at French ports and transportation through French territory was planned proves that the Anglo-Belgian arrangements were preceded by arrangements with the French General Staff. These three Powers fixed the exact plans for the cooperation of the "allied armies", as the document says. This is further substantiated by the fact that among these secret documents there was also found a map showing the French lines of deployment.

The report mentioned above contains some remarks of special interest. It is said there that Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had remarked that Holland's support could not be relied upon at that time, and that he had further given the confidential information that the British Government intended to transfer to Antwerp the basis for provisioning the British army as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. The British Military Attaché also suggested the establishment of a spy service in the Prussian Rhine Province.

A valuable supplement to these military documents discovered was found amongst the secret documents in the shape of a report by Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, addressed to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In it Baron Greindl reveals with great acumen the real reasons which prompted England to make this offer and he points out the dangerous situation in which Belgium had placed herself by taking sides with the Entente Powers. In this very detailed report, dated December 23rd, 1911, the full text of which

may at the Government's discretion be published in due course, Baron Greindl points out that the plan, drawn up by the Belgian General Staff for the defence of Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war and communicated to him (the minister) had bearing only on the question of what military measures should be taken in the event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, whereas the hypothesis of a French attack upon Germany through Belgium was equally within the range of possibilities. The Minister then proceeds as follows:

Appendix 39.

**Report of the Belgian Minister in Berlin,
dated December 23rd, 1911.**

“On the French side we are threatened not only in the south from Luxemburg, but there is also danger along our entire common frontier. For this assertion we have at hand not only mere suppositions, but also positive grounds.

“An outflanking evolution from the north is undoubtedly part of the military plan of the *Entente Cordiale*. Were it not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have caused such an outcry in Paris and London. The reason for wishing the Scheldt not to be fortified was not even kept secret. The purpose in view was to be able to transport without hindrance a British garrison to Antwerp in order to establish in Belgium a basis of operations for an offensive movement directed against the lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to draw us into the conflict,

which would not be difficult; for, after having given up that stronghold of our national safety, we should have discarded, through our own fault, the last chance of resisting the demands of our dubious protectors, having been so unwise as to let them in. The overtures of Colonel Barnadiston, made at the time when the *Entente Cordiale* was concluded, as perfidious as they were naive, clearly showed us what the game really was. When, however, it was seen that we were not intimidated by the apparent danger of a closure of the Scheldt, this plan was not entirely abandoned, but it was provided that the English expeditionary force was *not* to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the adjacent French ports. This is confirmed by the disclosures of Captain Faber, which have never been denied, as well as by the newspaper reports confirming them or supplementing them in certain points, which also have never been contradicted. The British army landed at Calais and Dunkerque would not march along our frontier to Longwy, in order to reach Germany; it would right away invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give it the advantage of going into action at once and striking the Belgian army in a region where we should be without a fortified position, in case we should be willing to risk a battle. This would enable the invading British army to occupy provinces having great resources of all kinds, and in any case to impede our mobilization, or to allow it only after having compelled us to mobilize solely for the benefit of England and of her ally.

“It is most imperative to work out in advance a plan of campaign for the Belgian army providing also for this eventuality. This is necessary in the interest of our military defence as well as of the management of our foreign policy in the event of a war between Germany and France.”

These remarks, made by an unbiassed personality, prove conclusively that the same Great-Britain that is now pretending to be the protectress of Belgian neutrality induced Belgium to side with the Entente Powers, and that at one time England even thought of infringing on the Netherlands' neutrality. Moreover it is clearly shown that the Belgian Government itself by lending its ear to the British proposals has made itself guilty of a grave offence against the obligations resting upon it as a neutral power. Had the Belgian Government acted in full accordance with the duties of a neutral country it would have come to an arrangement with Germany similar to the one made with France and England. The papers discovered supply the documentary proof of the fact, known to the German authorities long before the outbreak of war, that Belgium was conniving with the Entente Powers. These papers may serve as a justification of our military action, as well as a confirmation of the reports received by the German military authorities as to the intentions of France. May they open the eyes of the Belgian people to as to whom the catastrophe is due which has overtaken that unfortunate country.

Appendix 40.**Telegram of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Ambassador in Tokio on August 12th, 1914.**

East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government.

No answer to this has been received from Japan.

Appendix 41.**Ultimatum presented to the Imperial German Government by the Imperial Japanese Chargé d'Affaires Baron Funakoshi on August 17th, 1914.**

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

1. To withdraw immediately from^s the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those^{wh} which cannot be so withdrawn.

2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiautchau, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, They will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

Appendix 42.

Verbal answer given by the Imperial German Government to the Imperial Japanese Chargé d'Affaires on August 23rd, 1914.

The German Government has no reply to make to the demands of Japan. It is therefore obliged to recall the Imperial Ambassador in Tokio and to hand the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin his passports.

